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Comment
Partners Dumping Partners: Business Before Ethics in
Bohatch v. Butler & Binion
Margaret Kline Kirkpatrick*
Colette Bohatch, a partner at the law firm of Butler &
Binion, was fired for reporting what she believed in good faith
to be overbilling of a client by a fellow partner.1 Bohatch hadjoined the Washington, D.C. office of the Houston-based firm as
an associate in 1986, after working as Deputy Assistant Gen-
eral Counsel at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for
several years.2 The office was comprised of only two other at-
torneys: John McDonald, the managing partner of the office,
and Richard Powers, a partner.3 Most of the work of the three
attorneys revolved around one client, Pennzoil.4 Bohatch be-
came a partner in February 1990 and began receiving internal
operating reports containing the number of hours each attor-
ney worked, billed and collected.5 While reviewing these re-
ports, Bohatch became concerned that McDonald was misrep-
resenting how much work he was doing for Pennzoil.6
McDonald was charging Pennzoil for eight to twelve hours of
work every day, but Bohatch saw him working only three to
four hours each day.7 She reported what she believed to be
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Minnesota Law School; M.A. 1995(American History), Northwestern University;, BJA 1994, Middlebury College,Middlebury, VT. The author would like to thank Professor Maury Landsman,
Kari Thoe, Mark Weidemaier, and K Andrew Hall for their helpful advice.
1. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 544-45 (Tex. 1998).
2. See id. at 544.
3. See id.
4. See id
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 558. A recent symposium addressed unethical billing habitsin the legal profession. See Symposium, Unethical Billing Practices, 50 RUT-GERS L. REV. 2151 (1998). One commentator noted that in many law firms,[tihe lawyers are engaged in pervasive deception of clients, pretend-ing to be doing work that they are not doing, pretending to spend
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McDonald's ethical misconduct to other members of the firm's
management committee and was fired soon afterward.8 Bo-
hatch sued Butler & Binion, alleging breach of the partnership
agreement and breach of fiduciary duty.9 A jury in the 234th
District Court, Harris County, Texas, awarded Bohatch
$307,000 in actual damages from the firm and several of its
partners and $4 million in punitive damages from partners
Louis B. Paine, Jr., R. Hayden Burns, and John K. McDonald,
individually.10 All parties appealed to the Court of Appeals of
Texas, which reversed the punitive damages award and held
that the firm had not violated its fiduciary duty to Bohatch by
expelling her." The Texas Supreme Court affirmed. 12
Bohatch v. Butler & Binion raises the issue of whether a
law firm should be subject to tort damages for breach of fiduci-
ary duty if it terminates a partner who follows the ethical rules
of the legal profession and reports the misconduct of a fellow
attorney. The Texas Supreme Court, the first high court to ad-
dress this issue, grappled with the clash between attorneys'
ethical duties, which require them to report the misconduct of
other attorneys,13 and the common law doctrine of employment-
more time than they are spending, pretending that work needs to be
done which in fact does not need to be done. The delivery of legal
services is conceptualized principally as a billing opportunity to be
manipulated and expanded.
Lisa G. Lerman, Scenes from a Law Firm, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 2153, 2175-76
(1998).
& See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 544-45.
9. Bohatch's contract claim was based on the firm denying her a year-
end distribution for 1990 and for reducing her tentative distribution for 1991
to zero without requisite notice as required by the partnership agreement.
See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597, 604 (Tex. App. 1995). She
also argued that the firm breached the partnership agreement in refusing to
provide her with her monthly draw. See id. Finally, she contended that those
acts of the firm constituted a constructive eviction from the firm in violation of
the partnership agreement. See id. at 604-05.
10. See id. at 599. The punitive damages against the three partners were
reduced to $237,141 in the final judgment. See id.
11. See id. at 608. The Court of Appeals did, however, hold that the firm
was liable for damages for breach of the partnership agreement in failing to
provide Bohatch with her monthly draw before firing her and by not providing
notice of its decision to cut off her distribution for the following year. See id.
at 606. However, the court concluded that she was not entitled to compensa-
tion for the year in which she received her distribution in accordance with the
partnership agreement. See id. The court awarded Bohatch $225,000 in at-
torney's fees. See id. at 608.
12. See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 550.
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1983) [here-
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at-will, under which an employer can fire an employee for any
reason.14 The case raises the question whether courts should
protect whistleblowing partners by creating a public policy ex-
ception to the at-will nature of partnerships. In determining
whether a whistleblowing partner should be protected by the
courts, it is also important to consider whether an attorney
need be correct in his or her accusations of misconduct before
that attorney will be protected. It is also necessary to deter-
mine what effect partners' fiduciary duties have on the right of
a partnership to fire a partner who reports ethical misconduct
by another attorney.
While focusing on partners, this Comment argues that
courts should allow tort damages for all attorneys in law firms
who are expelled or otherwise sanctioned for reporting the mis-
conduct of other attorneys, as long as the reporting attorney in
good faith believes that misconduct has occurred. Part I de-
scribes the attorney's duty to report, the employment-at-will
rule and its application to law firms, and the fiduciary nature
of partnerships and the duty of good faith. Part II analyzes the
Bohatch v. Butler & Binion opinion and discusses the court's
decision that a firm may expel a whistleblowing partner. It
also looks both at the dissent's assertion that the firm violated
its fiduciary duties by expelling a partner who reported over-
billing by another partner and the attempt by the concurrence
to find a middle road. The Comment concludes that courts
should protect both partners and associates who report profes-
sional misconduct by allowing such attorneys to recover tort
damages when expelled or otherwise disciplined for following
their ethics codes.
I. THE DUTIES OF LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS
Under the common law doctrine of employment-at-will, if
employment is for an indefinite term, an employer may termi-
nate an employee at any time for any reason, or no reason.1 5 At
the same time, the legal profession demands that lawyers com-
inafter MODEL RULES]. Rule 8.3(a) states that "[a] lawyer having knowledge
that another lawyer has committed a violation of the rules of professional
conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trust-
worthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropri-
ate professional authority."
14. See, e.g., Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20
(1884) (defining employment at-will).
15. See infra Part I.B.
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ply with specified ethical standards, which include reporting
misconduct by a fellow attorney.'6 Often, attorneys are caught
in a no-win situation, because they are not protected from los-
ing their jobs if they obey their professional duty to report un-
ethical conduct.' 7
A. THE ATroRNEY's DuTy To REPORT
Disclosure of unethical conduct by a fellow attorney has
long been considered important to the legal profession in order
to maintain its integrity, to police itself, and to guard against
harm to society.'8 Nevertheless, until the early part of the
twentieth century, statements of legal ethics carried no binding
effect.' 9 The Canons of Professional Conduct were first set
forth by the American Bar Association in 1908 and encouraged
reporting of attorney misconduct without making it manda-
tory.20 In 1969, state bar associations began to adopt the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, and the reporting of attor-
ney misconduct finally became an obligation.21 Under the
Model Code, all lawyers have an absolute duty to report attor-
ney misconduct, an obligation which has been criticized for
contributing to mutual distrust among attorneys who have to
report even small infractions.22 Most states, including Texas,
have abandoned the Model Code in favor of the newer Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in 1983, which reject
16. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
17. See Anthony J. Blackwell, Wieder's Paradox: Reporting Legal Miscon-
duct in Law Firms, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9, 11 (1993).
18. See Blackwell, supra note 17, at 9 (citing Winters v. Houston Chron.
Pub. Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 729-31 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., concurring)).
19. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty To Report Another Law-
yer's Unethical Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 977,
978.
20. See Blackwell, supra note 17, at 22 (citing Canons of Professional
Ethics (1908)). Canon 28 stated that a "duty to the public and to the profes-
sion devolves upon every member of the Bar having knowledge of [improper
solicitation] to immediately inform thereof, to the end that the offender may
be disbarred," while Canon 29 encouraged intra-professional reporting of mis-
conduct to the appropriate tribunal. See id. at 22-23.
21. See id. at 23.
22. See id. at 24 (citing GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES,
THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 555-56 (Supp. 1989)). Another criticism of the duty
to report revolved around the theory that it would not be obeyed, which would
lead to cynicism about attorney misconduct. See id.
[Vol. 83:17671770
PARTNERSHIPS
the general reporting rule for breeding cynicism and for being
too difficult to enforce.23
Under Rule 8.3 of the Model Rules, an attorney who has
knowledge of another attorney's misconduct that "raises a sub-
stantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appro-
priate professional authority."24 The most significant differ-
ence between the Model Code and the Model Rules is that the
latter permit an attorney to decide whether the behavior of a
fellow attorney raises a "substantial question" as to his or her
fitness as an attorney.25 The Model Rules focus more on the
severity of the violation, rather than on the knowledge re-
quirement, the analysis of which is more flexible and may be
based on inferences from the circumstances.26 The reporting
requirement has generated confusion because Model Rule 8.3
fails to define exactly what constitutes a substantial offense or
what level of knowledge of misconduct is required before an at-
torney must report such misconduct.27 What is clear is that
23. See id. at 25. Texas has adopted virtually the same language as
Model Rule 8.3 in Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
8.03(a). In all, at least 47 states have adopted Model Rule 8.3. See Richard L.
Neumeier, Time for Massachusetts Lawyers To Do What Other Professionals
and Other Lawyers Already Must Do-Report Serious Misconduct, 42 BOSTON
B.J. 15, 15 (1998).
24. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, Rule 8.3(a).
25. See Michael J. Burwick, You Dirty Rat!! Model Rule 8.3 and Manda-
tory Reporting of Attorney Misconduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 137, 141
(1994). According to Burwick, the purpose of the change in wording was to
"make the provision more clear to attorneys, more workable in practice and
more easy to enforce." See id. Critics of the change have noted that the rule
is too subjective and may not in fact be so easy to enforce. See Cynthia L.
Gendry, Comment, Ethics-An Attorney's Duty To Report the Professional
Misconduct of Co-Workers, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 603, 605 (1994) (citing Gerard E.
Lynch, The Lawyer As Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491; James E. Mitchem, The
Lawyer's Duty To Report Ethical Violations, 18 COLO. LAW. 1915 (1989)).
26. See Burwick, supra note 25, at 142. According to one commentator,
the word "knowledge" in the Model Rules suggests an awareness that can be
"inferred from the circumstances about which the lawyer knows." Thomas M.
Carpenter, A Question of Duty and Honor: The Requirement To Report Law-
yers Who Violate the Code, 29 ARK. LAW. 16, 16 (1995).
27. See Burwick, supra note 25, at 143. Charles Wolfram stated that
[bloth the 1969 Code... and the 1983 Model Rules impose a manda-
tory reporting obligation bn every lawyer .... Probably no other po-
fessional requirement is as widely ignored by lawyers subject to it.
Lawyer complaints form a relatively small percentage of complaints
by lawyer discipline agencies. And some of these probably are moti-
vated by self-interest or self-protection of the complaining lawyer or
of a client.
17711999]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Rule 8.3 does not require an attorney who reports the ethical
lapses of another attorney to be one-hundred percent positive
that misconduct has occurred.28
In order to maintain the honesty of the legal profession,
the bar seeks to discipline attorneys who have engaged in mis-
conduct and often relies on fellow attorneys to report these
misdeeds.29 Although the duty to report a fellow attorney for
misconduct is an important part of the self-regulation of the le-
gal profession, many attorneys remain reluctant to report a
fellow attorney.30 Some outside of the legal profession have
gotten wind of this reluctance and believe that lawyers follow
an "unwritten code of silence" to protect each other from being
disciplined for unethical conduct.3 1 One reason for the lack of
attorney reporting may be that attorneys do not fear punish-
ment for failing to follow Model Rule 8.3 or an equivalent
Id. (citing CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS § 12.10.1, at 683-84
(1986)).
28. See Carpenter, supra note 26, at 16, 18 ("A lawyer should not fail to
report another lawyer simply because he lacks evidence to meet the ultimate
burden of proof. To rest a reporting requirement upon such a prerequisite
renders the rule a nullity.") Another commentator states that "[tlypically, the
reporting rule does not require that the quantum of evidence of which the
lawyer is aware be beyond dispute." Rotunda, supra note 19, at 985.
29. See Gendry, supra note 25, at 605. There are four objectives of the
duty to report attorney misconduct: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the
reputation of the legal profession; (3) to uphold justice; and (4) to prevent fur-
ther misconduct. See id. at 605-06 (citing ABA STANDARDS § 1.1, § 01:807
cmt.)
30. See Gendry, supra note 25, at 606. Gendry notes the words of one
author who stated, "he message of the reporting requirement is that the in-
tegrity of the legal profession must be protected, even at the expense of zeal-
ous advocacy, and the lawyer's own interests. Such is the burden of self-
regulation." Id. (citing David C. Olsson, Reporting Peer Misconduct: Lip Serv-
ice to Ethical Standards Is Not Enough, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 657, 666 (1989)); see
also Rotunda, supra note 19, at 979 (stating that an ABA special committee
determined that attorneys' and judges' hesitancy to report misconduct is a
significant problem with attorney discipline). One commentator cites three
reasons for the lack of compliance with the requirement: (1) ambivalence or
negative feelings about the duty to report; (2) not knowing about the require-
ment or how to report; and (3) worries about retaliation. See Margaret
Downie, Duty To Report, 32 ARIZ. ATTY 42, 42 (1996). The author posits that
reporting an attorney who is a co-worker may be even less appealing to an at-
torney because of close relationships that might have developed and the
greater likelihood of being discovered for reporting. See id. Some attorneys
do report however, as evidenced by the fact that in 1995, Arizona attorneys
filed 19% of the disciplinary charges investigated by the bar. See id.
31. Downie, supra note 30, at 42.
1772 [Vol. 83:1767
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rule.3 2 Judging from the use of the term "snitch rule" by attor-
neys, it also seems plain that they find reporting unpleasant.33
In addition, attorneys may fear that clients will not trust them
with their confidences if they think their attorneys will disclose
their secrets in the process of reporting the misconduct of an-
other attorney.34 In fact, under the Model Rules, attorneys' du-
ties of confidentiality take precedence over their reporting
duty, preventing them from revealing any information related
to the representation of a client without that client's consent.35
Finally, few states protect attorneys from retaliatory discharge,
and therefore there "exists a real danger that disclosure of dis-
honest lawyers will be stifled, that cynicism toward legal ethics
will be propagated, and that the reputation of the profession in
the public conscience will be further impugned."36
Despite the reporting rules, few courts have disciplined at-
torneys for not disclosing other attorneys' misconduct.37 In most
cases where attorneys have been disciplined for not reporting,
they have also done something else wrong.38 Usually, Model
Rule 8.3 serves as a back-up provision when it is uncertain
whether there is enough evidence of other, more serious
charges.39 The only case in which an attorney was disciplined
32. See Gendry, supra note 25, at 607.
33. See Laura Gatland, The Himmel Effect: 'Snitch Rule' Remains Con-
troversial but Effective, Especially in Illinois, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 24, 25.
34. See William L. Hutton, Note, The Lawyer's Duty To Report Another
Lawyer's Misconduct, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 683, 688-89 (1990).
35. See MODEL RULES, supra note 13, Rule 1.6 (stating that an attorney is
not to reveal "information relating to representation of a client unless the cli-
ent consents after consultation"). Thus, the mandatory reporting rule ex-
empts confidential information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. The comment
to Model Rule 8.3 notes that although "[a] report about misconduct is not re-
quired where it would involve violation of Rule 1.6," attorneys should "encour-
age [their] client[s] to consent to disclosure where prosecution would not sub-
stantially prejudice the client's interests."
36. Blackwell, supra note 17, at 12; see also id. at 44-48 for further expla-
nation.
37. See Rotunda, supra note 19, at 982.
38. See Burwick, supra note 25, at 148. In one case, two attorneys were
suspended from the practice of law for five years because they engaged in
kickback schemes and because they failed to tell the disciplinary committee of
the illegal conduct of another attorney. See In re Dowd, 559 N.Y.S.2d 365,
366-67 (App. Div. 1990) (per curiam).
39. See Burwick, supra note 25, at 150. In another case, an associate who
had knowledge of and participated in a partner's insurance fraud and other
misdeeds was reprimanded for both reasons. See Beverly Storm, Mandatory
Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct: Can the Bench & Bar of the Commonwealth
Discipline Itself Without It?, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 809, 811-12 (1993) (citing At-
17731999]
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solely for failing to report another attorney's misconduct was
the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in In re Himmel.40 In that
case, Attorney James H. Himmel was suspended for one year for
not informing a disciplinary commission about his client's prior
lawyer's misconduct.41 The case imposed "an enforceable duty
on lawyers to report other lawyers' misconduct." 2 The fear of
punishment has helped encourage reporting,4 3 but the fear of a
retaliatory discharge may also discourage some attorneys from
living up to their ethical responsibilities."
B. THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL RULE IN LAW FIRMS
1. The At-Will Rule
The employment-at-will doctrine, which grew out of the
laissez-faire climate in the United States in the late nineteenth
century, allows an employer or employee to terminate their
work relationship at any time for a good reason, a bad reason,
torney Grievance Comm'n v. Kahm, 431 A.2d 1336 (Md. 1981)).
40. 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988). In an unpublished Arizona decision, the
State Bar brought a case against an attorney who failed to report the miscon-
duct of another attorney. See Downie, supra note 30, at 42. The facts were
similar to those in Himmel, but the punishment was only a public censure,
rather than something more severe like suspension. One possible rationale
for the lighter sanction is that the Arizona case was decided prior to Himmel,
and therefore the court did not have Himmel as guidance. See id.
41 See Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 796. The case involved a suburban Chi-
cago attorney who failed to report the embezzlement of $35,000 by his client's
former lawyer. See id. at 791. When the injured client came to Himmel for
representation, Himmel did not report the conversion to the Illinois bar. See
id. The attorney believed that his client did not want him to report the mis-
conduct and also believed that his client had already filed a grievance report.
See id. Himmel had practiced law for eleven years and had never been the
subject of ethical complaints. See Carpenter, supra note 26, at 18.
42. Hutton, supra note 34, at 684.
43. See Gatland, supra note 33, at 24. One year after the Himmel deci-
sion, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission received
922 reports from attorneys of other attorneys' misconduct. See id.
44. See WOLFRAM, supra note 27, § 12.10.1, at 684:
Filing a disciplinary complaint can incur substantial personal risk for
a lawyer if the subject of the complaint is a lawyer in a position of
power in the.., legal system. Particularly in small communities or
when the lawyers... have close practice relationships, friendships
and future clientele and fees might be seriously at risk.
See also Blackwell, supra note 17, at 11 (stating that it is not surprising that
when faced with a choice between preserving their ethics and saving theirjobs, attorneys often choose to ignore misconduct by fellow attorneys);
Seymour Moskowitz, Employment-At-Will & Codes of Ethics: The Profes-
sional's Dilemma, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 33, 56 (1988).
1774 [Vol. 83:1767
or for no reason.45 This doctrine differs from the English com-
mon law rule that an employee could be discharged only after a
notice period, which was determined by the custom of the
trade, or if there was no custom, a reasonable time.46 Although
employment at-will remains the presumptive employment rela-
tionship today in the United States, many courts and legisla-
tures in recent years have reassessed and limited the doctrine
because of fears that it too often results in unjust dismissals of
employees. 47 Congress has passed several statutes limiting an
employer's right to discharge an employee. 48 In addition, states
have passed legislation to protect whistleblowers against
wrongful discharge. These statutes vary in their protections,
with some states like New York offering only limited protection
in cases where public health and safety are at stake, while
45. See generally Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at
Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976). In one decision, the Tennessee
Supreme Court took this approach in stating that "[all may dismiss their em-
ployees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for
cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Payne v.
Western & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915). The United
States Supreme Court once explained that
the right of the employ6 to quit the service of the employer, for what-
ever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever
reason, to dispense with the services of such employ6.... In all such
particulars the employer and the employ6 have equality of right, and
any legislation that disturbs equality is an arbitrary interference
with the liberty of contract .... "
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908), overruled by Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941).
46. See Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Under-
standing the Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L.
REV. 719, 721 (1991).
47. See Blackwell, supra note 17, at 27-28 (suggesting that one reason
courts are more likely to limit the at-will employment rule is that they recog-
nize that workers these days are often hired by big companies rather than
small businesses, which has reduced employees' bargaining power). In addi-
tion, the decline in unions has meant that employees have less job security.
See id. According to one court, "[ilt is beyond question that the employment-
at-will rule allows employers to effectively pressure employees to commit
wrongful or illegal acts through the threat of dismissal." Salter v. Alfa Ins.
Co., 561 So.2d 1050, 1055 (Ala. 1990) (Hornsby, C.J., concurring).
48. Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to fire an employee because
of race, color, religion, gender or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1994). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994),
forbids an employer from discharging an employee because of his or her age.
In addition, federal whistleblower provisions protecting employees who report
illegal conduct are included in some federal statutes, including the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994).
PARTNERSHIPS 17751999]
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other states like Connecticut protect employees who report
suspected violations of any law of regulation.49
2. Exceptions to the At-Will Rule
Public policy exceptions to the at-will rule have emerged
around the country, creating causes of action for wrongful dis-
charge under contract or tort theories against employers who
expel employees for reasons contrary to societal interest.5 0 For
instance, many jurisdictions refuse to uphold the expulsion of
an employee who refuses to break the law at the employer's
behest.5 1 Application of the public policy exceptions has often
been confusing, and courts have defined the term "public pol-
icy" in different ways. While a California court postulated that
public policy means that "no citizen can lawfully do that which
has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the pub-
lic good,"52 the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that "public
policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citi-
zens of the state collectively."53 Some courts require that a dis-
charged employee show a violation of a statute or constitu-
tional provision, while others allow plaintiffs to demonstrate
that public policy derives from other sources, such as ethical
codes and judicial decisions. 54
49. See Cathryn C. Dakin, Note, Protecting Attorneys Against Wrongful
Discharge: Extension of the Public Policy Exception, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1043, 1052 (1995) (discussing how some states have passed laws to encourage
employees to report violations of law). For example, Illinois protects employ-
ees who report misconduct that they reasonably believe poses a danger to
public safety, is an abuse of authority, shows mismanagement, or is a waste of
funds. See id.
50. See Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law As the Century Turns: A Changing
of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 13-14 (1988) (explaining that not only have
courts around the country recognized limitations to the at-will rule of em-
ployment, but also that many states have statutes that protect whistleblowers
from retaliatory discharge).
51. See, e.g., Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C.
1991) (holding that a truck driver's wrongful discharge claim was actionable
because he was fired for refusing to drive a truck that was missing a required
inspection sticker); see also Blackwell, supra note 17, at 30-31 (explaining that
in most jurisdictions, an employer cannot fire an employee for refusing to
break the law).
52. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Intl Ass'n, 261 P.2d 721, 726
(Cal. 1953).
53. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill.
1981).
54. See Dakin, supra note 49, at 1055.
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3. Exception to the At-Will Rule for Lawyers
Many courts have been unwilling to deviate from the at-
will rule when the employee is an attorney.5 5 Attorneys, with
the exception of partners in law firms, are at-will employees.
While in the nineteenth century many attorneys were solo
practitioners, their numbers have decreased in recent years,
and the number of attorneys employed in law firms has in-
creased.56 There are several reasons for courts' caution about
adopting a legal ethics exception to the employment at-will
doctrine. First, courts believe that the ethical code that binds
attorneys protects the public interest, such that extension of
the public policy exception is unnecessary.57 Second, they as-
sume that allowing such suits would harm the attorney-client
relationship, which is founded on confidence and trust.5 8 Fi-
nally, courts have been reluctant to protect attorneys who re-
port the misconduct of fellow attorneys, because a duty to the
public is not implicated in the same way it would be if the
health or safety of the public were on the line.59 Only three
55. In New York, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly stated that the
legislature, rather than the courts, should determine whether exceptions
should be made to the at-will employment rule. In one case, the court de-
clared that "significant alteration of employment relationships ... is best left
to the Legislature because stability and predictability in contractual affairs is
a highly desirable jurisprudential value." Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506
N.E.2d 919, 923 (N.Y. 1987) (citation omitted). In another case, the court re-
marked that
[tihe Legislature has infinitely greater resources and procedural
means to discern the public will, to examine the variety of pertinent
considerations, to elicit the view of the various segments of the com-
munity that would be directly affected... and to investigate and an-
ticipate the impact of imposition of [changes to the employment at-
will doctrine].
Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y. 1983).
56. See Dakin, supra note 49, at 1050-51 (1995). While today only ap-
proximately 52% of attorneys practice by themselves or with one other part-
ner, in 1930 most attorneys were either solo practitioners or worked with just
one other partner. See id. at 1050 n.39.
57. See id. at 1045.
58. See id.
59. See Blackwell, supra note 17, at 38. There are many reasons why it
might be advantageous to report suspected professional misconduct first to
one's firm and then to the state disciplinary committee: (1) the firm has the
opportunity to respond and clarify any possible misunderstanding, (2) the at-
torney avoids public embarrassment to his/her colleagues and firm if the sus-
picion was wrong, (3) the firm may make a more formal and less partisan re-
port to the committee; (4) reporting demonstrates the attorney's loyalty to the
firm and the profession by not making an unsubstantiated charge public; (5)
by reporting, attorneys help to protect the public against unethical attorneys;
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states, including Texas, have indicated that a professional code
of conduct can serve as a significant source of public policy that
leads to an exception to the at-will doctrine. 6o
Some courts have wanted to protect attorneys from wrong-
ful discharge while at the same time avoiding an extension of
the public policy exception and, therefore, have permitted at-
torneys to bring wrongful discharge suits on the basis of breach
of contract. In Wieder v. Skala, an associate who had been
terminated because of his insistence that the firm report the
misconduct of another associate to the appropriate disciplinary
committee brought suit against his former employer.6' The
court found that the plaintiff stated a claim for breach of con-
tract based on an implied-in-law obligation, but it declined to
recognize the tort of abusive discharge, stating that alterations
in the employment relationship are best left to the legisla-
ture.62
Nevertheless, the Wieder court did recognize that there
exists an implied-in-law understanding in the hiring of an as-
sociate to practice law that both the associate and the firm will
comply with the profession's standard of ethics:63
Associates are, to be sure, employees of the firm but they remain in-
dependent officers of the court responsible in a broader public sense
for their professional obligations. Practically speaking, plaintiffs du-
ties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an associate of the firm
were so closely linked as to be incapable of separation."
The court also made a point of noting that the rule of profes-
sional conduct requiring attorneys to report the misconduct of
other attorneys is essential to the self-regulation and survival
of the legal profession.65
One commentator has noted that the court's finding of an
implied-in-law duty purely by relying on the firm's hiring of the
(6) if the firm refuses to act on the report, the attorney must still report inde-
pendently to the disciplinary committee. See id. at 40.
60. See id. at 42.
61. 609 N.E.2d 105, 106 (N.Y. 1992).
62. See id. at 110.
63. See id. at 108. In holding that a claim for breach of contract existed
against the law firm when an associate was fired for reporting another associ-
ate's misconduct, the court stated that "[intrinsic to [the hiring of an attorney
to practice law] ... was the unstated but essential compact that in conducting
the firm's legal practice both plaintiff and the firm would do so in compliance
with the prevailing rules of conduct and ethical standards of the profession."
Id. at 109-10.
641 Id. at 108.
65. See id.
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plaintiff supports the far-reaching conclusion that an implied-
in-law term exists between all law firms and their associates. 66
This means that upon entering into an employment relation-
ship, a firm and an attorney, whether they explicitly state so or
not, are mutually bound to adhere to the ethical requirements
of the profession. Some courts, seemingly embracing this view,
have commented that attorneys should not be allowed to con-
tract around the ethical duties of the profession.67 At least one
commentator has argued that because courts have always
wielded almost exclusive control over attorneys, they should
not wait for the legislature but should instead adopt a public
policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine based on
professional ethics rules.68
C. THE FDucIARY NATURE OF PARTNERSHIPS AND THE DUTY OF
GOOD FAITH
While a law firm associate is more like an ordinary em-
ployee, a partner is on equal footing with his or her fellow
partners, which may make a difference in terms of a partner's
protection from expulsion. The relationship among partners is
not a true "employment!' relationship and "differs markedly
from that between.., the partnership and its associates."69
66. See Dakin, supra note 49, at 1071. The Wieder court concluded that
"in any hiring of an attorney as an associate to practice law with a firm there
is implied an understanding so fundamental to the relationship and essential
to its purpose as to require no expression." 609 N.E.2d at 108.
67. See, e.g., Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 109-10. The Texas Supreme Court
has noted that contracts often involve special relationships that could result
in duties enforceable as torts. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLanney,
809 S.W.2d 493, 494 n.1 (Tex. 1991). Nevertheless, in DeLanney, the court
held that a plaintiffs claim against a telephone company for failing to publish
an advertisement was based solely in contract and was not a tort. See id. at
495. The court distinguished this situation from a case in which it had al-
lowed recovery both in contract and in tort to a homeowner whose water
heater had not been properly repaired by defendant. See id. at 494 (citing
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. 1947)).
In Scharrenbeck, the court found that the defendant had a contractual obliga-
tion to properly repair the water heater, as well as a common law duty to per-
form his job with care and skill. See id.
68. See Christopher G. Senior, Comment, Does New York's Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility Force Lawyers To Put Their Jobs on the Line? A Critical
Look at Wieder v. Skala, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 417, 447 (1992).
69. Hinshon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 (1984) (Powell, J., con-
curring). Hinshon involved a former associate who sued her former law firm
for sex discrimination based on its failure to make her a partner. See id. at
72. The Supreme Court found that her complaint stated a valid claim under
Title VII, because as long as consideration for partnership was a term of em-
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The position of a law firm partner is similar to that of a ten-
ured professor who cannot be expelled except for serious mis-
conduct.7 0 In the same way, an employee who has been hired
for a term of years historically has been protected against dis-
charge without cause.71 An expectation exists among associ-
ates that if they work long hours and make many personal sac-
rifices, they will make partner, which they have reason to
believe will confer on them wealth, security and more power in
the firm.7 2 In other words, having made partner, attorneys of-
ten believe that their position in the firm is secure, only to dis-
cover later that they have been expelled.
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA),73 adopted
by all but one state, represents a fairly uniform and stable
statement of partnership law and establishes standards of con-
duct for partners.74 When analyzing an expulsion case under
RUPA, which has been adopted in Texas,75 several questions
need to be answered. First, it is necessary to inquire whether
the expulsion violated the duties of loyalty and care owed to
one's partners.76 Under section 404(b) of RUPA, a breach of the
duty of loyalty has occurred if one of the following three com-
ployment, the firm's decision could not be based on anything prohibited by Ti-
tle VII. See id. at 74-75.
70. See id. at 80-81 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
71. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Employment-at-Will-Is The Model Act
the Answer?, 23 STETSON L. REV. 179, 179 (1993).
72. See Mark S. Kende, Shattering the Glass Ceiling: A Legal Theory for
Attacking Discrimination Against Women Partners, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 17, 74(1994). Kende argues that if a law firm could fire a female partner for dis-
criminatory reasons, it would be inconsistent with her reasonable expecta-
tions. See id. Firms encourage associates to believe that making partner is
worth their sacrifices. See id.
73. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (amended 1994), 6 U.L.A. 1-124 (1995 &
Supp. 1998). The Act's official title does not include the word "revised," but it
is commonly referred to as "RUPA" because it is a convenient and easily-
pronounced acronym and RUPA is indeed a substantial revision of the Uni-
form Partnership Act (UPA). See J. Dennis Hynes, The Revised Uniform
Partnership Act: Some Comments on the Latest Draft of RUPA, 19 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 727, 727 n.1 (1992).
74. RUPA is a revision of the Uniform Partnership Act, which was first
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1914. See Hynes, supra note 73, at 727-28. Every state except Lou-
isiana had adopted the Uniform Partnership Act. See id. at 728 n.6. Accord-
ing to one commentator, the UPA has "stood the test of time." Id. at 728.
75. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 554 (Tex. 1998).
76. See J. William Callison, Blind Men and Elephants: Fiduciary Duties
Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Uniform Limited Liability Com-
pany Act, and Beyond, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 109, 139 (1997).
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ponents of the duty has been breached: (1) a partner must "ac-
count to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any prop-
erty, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct
and winding up of the partnership business or derived from a
use by the partner of partnership property"; (2) a partner must
not deal adversely with the partnership; and (3) a partner
must not compete with the partnership. 7  No breach of the
duty of loyalty has occurred if the action by the partners falls
outside these three categories.7 8
Second, it is necessary to analyze whether the partners
breached their obligation of "good faith and fair dealing," which
is based on both the contractual roots of the partnership and
its fiduciary nature.7 9 An implied covenant of good faith exists
in every contract, according to section 205 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts.80 Further strengthening the obligation
of good faith is the fiduciary duty that exists among partners.
Under RUPA, the duty of good faith is mandatory and cannot
be waived.8' Yet, RUPA does not explicitly define the duty.8 2
Because "good faith" has not been explicitly defined, courts
have developed their own definitions of the term. Determining
whether an action taken by a partnership was done in good
faith involves an inquiry into motive and is inherently open-
ended and subjective.83 Some courts have adopted the view
that a breach of the implied covenant of good faith exists if the
parties would have proscribed the act had they thought to ne-
gotiate with respect to that issue.84 As one commentator has
77. See RUPA § 404(b).
78. See Callison, supra note 76, at 139.
79. See RUPA § 404(d). It is interesting to note that except for a narrow
clause dealing with expulsions, the obligation of good faith and fair dealing
was not expressly required in the Uniform Partnership Act, which was the
uniform statement of the law of partnership for the first seventy-five years of
the century. See Robert M. Phillips, Comment, Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1179, 1181
(1993).
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
81. See Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate To Appropriate Corpo-
rate Concepts: Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64
U. COLO. L. REv. 111, 143 (1993).
82. Although the drafting committee intentionally left the term unde-
fined, one commentator has argued that it is imperative for the meaning of
the obligation to be defined in RUPA. See Phillips, supra note 79, at 1183.
83. See Hynes, supra note 73, at 741-42.
84- See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986). The
Katz court set forth the following test:
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noted, "[t]he implied obligation of good faith imposes a limita-
tion on a contracting party's ability to exercise legal rights in a
way that deprives the other party of the substance of the ex-
press bargain that he had reached."85 The Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC) demonstrates a narrow conception of "good
faith," defining it as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transac-
tion concerned."86 One court looked at good faith more broadly
and focused on the tortious state of mind of the expelling
party.87 In order to prove a tortious state of mind, a plaintiff
must show that the defendant intended to create harm or that
the defendant's actions constituted wanton and reckless or
willful misconduct.88
Several courts have found that an expulsion of a partner
breaches the duty of good faith. For example, an Illinois court
held that a partner could not be expelled for persistently re-
questing to exercise his rights to view the firm's books and rec-
ords under the partnership agreement. 9 The court agreed
with the partner that his expulsion was void because it vio-
lated the implicit duty of good faith that exists between part-
[I]s it clear from what was expressly agreed upon that the parties
who negotiated the express terms of the contract would have agreed
to proscribe the act later complained of as a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith-had they thought to negotiate with respect to
that matter. If the answer to this question is yes, then.., a court isjustified in concluding that such act constitutes a breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith.
Id. at 880.
85. Callison, supra note 76, at 142.
86. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (Supp. 1998).
87. See Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund,
H, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199, 1208 (Del. 1993).
88. See Callison, supra note 76, at 147. Callison states that only three
reported cases employ the term "tortious state of mind." See id. at 146 (citing
Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, H, L.P., 624
A.2d 1199 (Del. 1993); Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Kan. 1992);
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Cone, 492 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)).
89. See Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239, 246 (IM. App. Ct.
1996). The expelled partner made repeated requests to look at the firm's fi-
nancial statements by invoking a provision in the partnership agreement in-
volving "access to the firm's books and records." Id. at 243. Shortly after he
made a final request to view the books, he received written notice that he was
being discharged from the firm because his international trade practice was
incompatible with the firm's interests and because his conduct was "disturb-
ing." Id. at 244. The partner refused to leave the firm, and the firm expelled
him. The court found that the partners had expelled the partner for self-gain
and that "regardless of the discretion conferred upon partners under a part-
nership agreement, this does not abrogate their high duty to exercise good
faith and fair dealing in the execution of such discretion." Id. at 246.
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ners.90 The court also acknowledged that a fiduciary relation-
ship exists among partners and that each partner must exer-
cise good faith and honesty in all matters regarding the part-
nership.91 In another case, a Florida court held that the
partnership breached its fiduciary duty to a partner by expel-
ling him in order to produce greater profits for the remaining
partners.92 In a case decided by the California Supreme Court,
Justice Traynor stated that a partner violated his fiduciary du-
ties by expelling another partner in bad faith.93 Following the
California court's reasoning, the Georgia Supreme Court has
held that Georgia law prohibits bad faith termination of a
partnership.94 Some courts have had a narrower understand-
ing of fiduciary duties and have held that partners violate a fi-
duciary duty in expelling another partner only if they act with
dishonest or sinister motives or for self-gain. 95
On the other hand, many state courts wishing to retain the
traditional employment-at-will doctrine have refused alto-
gether to find an implied covenant of good faith that would
90. See id. at 244-46.
91. See id. at 244-45.
92. See Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft v. Beasley, 1998 WL 904065(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1998). At a secret meeting of the firm's partners,
a list was compiled of the least productive partners, including the plaintiff.See id. at *1. All of the plaintiffs fellow partners in the Palm Beach office
were included on this list. See id. The firm then decided to close the firm'sPalm Beach office. See id. The District Court of Appeals of Florida held that
while the management committee had the power to close an office, they did
not have the right to expel a partner if there was not a provision regarding
expulsion in the partnership agreement. See id. at *3. Although the firm of-
fered to transfer the plaintiff to the New York or Washington offices, the court
stated that this was not a good faith offer, since the partner had spent his
whole career in Florida and would therefore not be very capable of winning
new clients in these northern cities. See id.
93. See Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1961) ("A partner may not...
by use of adverse pressure 'freeze out' a co-partner and appropriate the busi-
ness to his own use.").
94. See Wilensky v. Blalock, 414 S.E.2d 1, 4 (Ga. 1992) (holding that al-
though defendant was permitted to terminate a partnership, he was still li-
able for tortious interference for trying to keep all of its assets and business
opportunities).
95. See, e.g., St. Joseph's Reg'l Health Ctr. v. Munos, 934 S.W.2d 192, 197(Ark. 1996) (finding that because a legitimate business reason existed for a
partner's termination of another partner's contract, no fiduciary duty was
breached); Leigh v. Crescent Square, Ltd., 608 N.E.2d 1166, 1170 (Ohio 1992)("We find that a general partner's fiduciary duty applies only to activities
where a partner will take advantage of his position in the partnership for his
own profit or gain.").
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prevent a partnership from firing a partner.96 In holding that
there was no breach of fiduciary duty when a partnership ex-
pelled partners without stating a reason, one court stated that
the "guillotine" method seemed desirable: "While this course of
action may shock the sensibilities of some, to others it may be
that once the initial decision is made, the traumatic reaction to
that decision is more quickly overcome and the end result more
merciful. 97 Similarly, in another case, the court upheld the
expulsion of a partner under the no-cause expulsion clause of a
partnership agreement because "[the partners] intent was to
provide a simple, practical, and above all, a speedy method of
separating a partner from the firm."98
II. THE TRIUMPH OF FIRM BUSINESS NEEDS IN
BOHATCH V. BUTLER & BINION
In Bohatch v. Butler & Binion,99 the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether a law firm owed a partner a
duty not to expel her for reporting the overbilling of another
partner. Although the employment at-will doctrine prevails in
Texas, as it does around the country, the court was faced with
an argument that it should make an exception for a partner
who reports the misconduct of another attorney because of her
professional obligations under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct. 100 The court also had to determine
96. See Kende, supra note 72, at 61 n.192.
97. Holman v. Cole, 522 P.2d 515, 524 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). The court
stated that a clean severance is desirable because when a schism develops
among partners, "its magnitude may be exaggerated rightfully or wrongfully
to the point of destroying a harmonious accord." Id.
98. Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 442 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990). The court went on to say that
[wihere the remaining partners in a firm deem it necessary to ex-
pel a partner under a no cause expulsion clause in a partnership
agreement freely negotiated and entered into, the expelling partners
act in "good faith" regardless of motivation if that act does not cause
a wrongful withholding of money or property legally due the expelled
partner at the time he is expelled.
Id. at 442-43.
99. 977 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. 1998).
100. See id. at 546. The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
are modeled after the Model Rules. See supra note 13. Rule 8.03 of the Texas
Rules reads in part, "a lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has
committed a violation of applicable rules of professional conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as
a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate disciplinary author-
ity."
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whether the existence of a fiduciary duty among partners
should have prevented the firm from firing Bohatch.' 01
Bohatch took steps to protect her partnership and its client
upon concluding that a fellow partner was engaged in ethical
misconduct. Bohatch went to the other partner, Powers, to dis-
cuss her concern about McDonald's billing practices, which it
turned out he shared.10 2 The two of them reviewed McDonald's
time record together and made copies of the previous two
months' records.10 3 Powers advised Bohatch that she should
take some action.104 In July, she reported her belief that
McDonald was overbilling Pennzoil between $20,000 and
$25,000 per month to Louis Paine, the firm's managing partner
in Houston.1 05 He said he would investigate.106 Bohatch then
told Powers that she had reported her concerns to Paine.107
The following day, Powers talked with McDonald privately for
an hour, and afterwards McDonald spoke with Bohatch.108 Bo-
hatch testified that McDonald, with "red-faced anger," in-
formed her that Pennzoil was unhappy with her work, which
she testified was the first time that she had ever heard of their
dissatisfaction with her. 09 He informed her that henceforth he
would be supervising her work and subsequently took away all
of her work for Pennzoil.'10 Bohatch telephoned Paine and two
other members of the firm's management committee, R. Hay-
den Burns and Marion E. McDaniel, and reiterated her con-
cerns about McDonald's billing practices.1 ' The three man-
10L See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 544.
102. See id.
103. See id. They noticed that many of the records were vague and did not
comply with the firm's requirements for time record-keeping. See id. at 558
(Spector, J., dissenting). Bohatch believed that McDonald had lied in his rec-
ords to hide his overbilling. See id.
104. See id. at 558 (Spector, J., dissenting). Before reporting her concerns
to anyone else, Bohatch read the District of Columbia's ethical rules and
spoke with an attorney. See id.
105. See id. Paine informed Bohatch that she had done the right thing in
telling him her concerns. See id.
106. See id. at 544.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 558 (Spector, J., dissenting).
109. See id.
110. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex. App. 1995).
Her work on a pending case for Pennzoil was assigned to an associate who had
only been working at the firm for one month. See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 559
(Spector, J., dissenting).
111. See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 544.
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agement committee members then called McDonald, who re-
ported Pennzoil's dissatisfaction with Bohatch's work."2
Over the next month, Paine and Burns investigated Penn-
zoil's bills and concluded that they contained no problems.113
They also spoke about the bills with Pennzoil's in-house coun-
sel, John Chapman, who had a longstanding relationship with
McDonald." 4 He stated that the company was satisfied with
its bills but was unhappy with Bohatch's work."5 Pennzoil's
legal department also reviewed the bills and determined that
they were reasonable." 6 In August, Paine met with Bohatch
and told her that the firm had completed its investigation and
had found no basis for her allegations."17 He also mentioned
that she should start looking for new employment, but told her
that the firm would help her out by giving her a recommenda-
tion, providing her with her monthly draw, permitting her to
continue to use her office, and continuing her insurance cover-
age.118 From that day forward, the firm gave Bohatch no fur-
ther work.'19
In January 1991, the firm refused to give Bohatch her
year-end distribution for 1990 and reduced her tentative dis-
tribution share for 1991 to zero. 20 The firm paid Bohatch her
last monthly draw in June, after notifying her in May of its in-
tent to do so. 121 In August, the firm informed Bohatch that she
would have to vacate her office by November, but by September
Bohatch had found a new position with the law firm of Duncan
& Allen. 22 A month later she filed suit against Butler & Bin-
ion alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful dis-
charge. 23 A few days afterward, on October 21, 1991, the firm
voted to expel her. 24
112. See Bohatch, 905 S.W.2d at 600.
113. See id.
114 See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 544.
115. See Bohatch, 905 S.W.2d at 600.
116. See id.
117. See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 544.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 544-45.
121. See Bohatch, 905 S.W.2d at 600.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124 See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 545.
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The trial court granted summary judgment for the firm on
the claims of wrongful discharge and the claims for breach of
fiduciary duty and breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing for any conduct occurring on or after October 21,
1991.125 The trial court denied summary judgment, however,
for the claims of breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing for acts that occurred prior
to that date.126 The case was tried before a jury on the breach
of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims.127 The jury
found that the firm had breached its partnership agreement
and its fiduciary duty.128 Bohatch received actual damages of
$57,000 for lost earnings in the past and $250,000 for mental
anguish in the past.129 The jury awarded her $4 million in pu-
nitive damages because of the breach of fiduciary duty by
Paine, Burns and McDonald. 130 The jury also awarded attor-
ney's fees.13' The trial court entered judgment for Bohatch in
the amounts determined by the jury, but deleted the award of
attorney's fees, because the judgment was based in tort. 32 Bo-
hatch accepted and the trial court entered a second judgment
reducing the punitive damages award to $237,141.133
All parties appealed, and the court of appeals concluded
that the firm had violated provisions of the partnership agree-
ment and that the firm had a duty not to expel a partner in bad
faith.134 The court defined "bad faith" as meaning that part-
ners cannot be expelled for the self-gain of other partners. 135
Finding no evidence that Bohatch had been expelled for self-
gain, the court determined that Bohatch could not recover on
the theory of breach of fiduciary duty.136 It did, however, hold
that the firm had violated certain provisions of the partnership
agreement in not providing advance notice of its plans not to
provide her with her partnership distribution for 1991 and in
terminating her monthly draw a few months before her termi-
125. See Bohatch, 905 S.W.2d at 600.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 601.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 604, 606.
135. See id. at 603.
136. See id. at 604.
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nation.137 The court concluded that Bohatch was entitled to
$35,000 for lost earnings in 1991 but none for 1990, a year in
which she received her distribution. 138 The court also refused
to grant her mental anguish damages, but did render a judg-
ment of $225,000 in attorney's fees. 139
A. THE MAJORITY
The primary issues addressed by the Texas Supreme Court
in Bohatch v. Butler & Binion were whether a partnership
should be permitted to oust a partner who reports ethics viola-
tions by another partner and whether to create an exception to
the at-will rule for attorneys. Because no controlling Texas
cases existed, the Texas Supreme Court looked to cases in
other jurisdictions that had held that partners may fire a part-
ner for business reasons. 140 The court noted that neither stat-
utes nor contract law principles directly address whether a law
firm owes a duty to a partner not to fire him or her. 141
The court held that a partner can be expelled without
subjecting the partnership to tort damages, focusing on the dif-
ficulties a firm would face if it had to retain a partner with
whom others felt it impossible to work. 42 The court noted that
other courts had held that firms can expel partners in order to
maintain solid relationships among partners and with cli-
ents.43 The court stated that partners do not face an obliga-
137. See id. at 605-06.
138. See id. at 606.
139. See id. at 606, 608.
140. The court noted that the Texas Uniform Partnership Act did not pro-
vide much assistance, because it deals with expulsions only in the context of
the breakup of a partnership. See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 545-46 (citing TEL
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701b). In addition, the new Texas Revised Part-
nership Act did not apply because it has no retroactive effect. See id. Bo-
hatch & Binion's partnership agreement failed to shed light on the matter be-
cause it did not address the grounds for expulsion, but only described the
procedures that must be followed when a partner is fired. See id.
141. See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 545-46.
142. See id. The court stated that a firm should be able to expel a partner
"for purely business reasons," citing cases from other jurisdictions to that ef-
fect. Id. (citing St. Joseph's Reg'l Health Ctr. v. Munos, 934 S.W.2d 192, 197(Ark. 1996); Leigh v. Crescent Square, Ltd., 608 N.E.2d 1166, 1170 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992)).
143. One court held that a law firm could expel a recovering alcoholic
partner because "if a partner's propensity toward alcohol has the potential to
damage his firm's good will or reputation for astuteness in the practice of law,
simple prudence dictates the exercise of corrective action.., since the sur-
vival of the partnership itself potentially is at stake." Lawlis v. Kightlinger &
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tion to remain partners since "at the heart of the partnership
concept is the principle that partners may choose with whom
they wish to be associated."'" The court noted that, in par-
ticular, some courts have determined that no breach of fiduci-
ary duty exists where a firm fires a partner in order to remedy
a schism in the firm.145 The court believed that after an accu-
sation of unethical conduct, the trust among the partners
would be destroyed, and they would find it difficult to work to-
gether to serve their clients. 46
While recognizing an attorney's duty to report the ethical
violations of fellow attorneys, the court refused to let this duty
override the importance of keeping the firm intact. 147 It noted
Bohatch and the amici curiae's arguments for recognizing a
limited duty to retain partners for the public policy reason of
discouraging firms from retaliating against a partner who
complies with rules of professional conduct. 48 The court stated
that although it refused to recognize a protected status for
whistleblowers, its decision "in no way obviates the ethical du-
ties of lawyers." 49 It acknowledged that attorneys can be placed
Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Partnerships exist only be-
cause of the trust and confidence that the members place in one another, ac-
cording to Holman v. Cole, 524 P.2d 515, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), which
held that when a law firm expels two partners because of their contentious
behavior during executive committee meetings, the firm has not breached a
fiduciary duty.
144. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 545 (citing Gelder Med. Group v. Webber, 394
N.Y.S.2d 867, 870-71 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)).
145. For instance, in Waite v. Sylvester, 560 A.2d 619, 622-23 (N.H. 1989),
the court held that a managing partner could be discharged because of legiti-
mate business needs. The court indicated that in order to resolve a "funda-
mental schism" among partners, expulsion of a partner may be the best op-
tion. Id. at 623. In another case, a court held that a law firm had not
breached its fiduciary duty when it expelled a partner whose billable hours
were low and who offended some of the firm's clients. See Heller v. Pillsbury
Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
146. See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 546-47. The concurrence even went so far
as to suggest that a lawyer who really cared about the ethics of the legal pro-
fession would take matters into his or her own hands and leave a firm that
was not willing to report a partner who engaged in unethical conduct. See id.
at 554 (Hecht, J., concurring).
147. With regard to the briefs of the amici curiae, the concurrence stated,
"Their arguments have force, but they do not explain how a relationship of
trust necessary for both the existence of the firm and the representation of its
clients can survive such serious accusations by one partner against another."
Id. at 554 (Hecht, J., concurring).
148. See id. at 546.
149. See id. at 547.
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in a difficult position because their duty to report may create a
schism among partners, but that this "neither excuses failure
to report nor transforms expulsion as a means of resolving that
schism into a tort.150 In refusing to protect reporting attor-
neys, the court remained focused on the idea that not only
might a firm not survive in the wake of accusations of miscon-
duct, but even if the firm stayed intact, "[the threat of tort li-
ability for expulsion would tend to force partners to remain in
untenable circumstance-suspicious of and angry with each
other-to their own detriment and that of their clients whose
matters are neglected by lawyers distracted with intra-firm
frictions. 151
B. THE DISSENT
The dissenting justices, seeing the practice of law less as a
business and more as a profession, 152 would have held that the
Butler & Binion partners violated their fiduciary duties when
they expelled Bohatch for informing them of her belief that a
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 559 (Spector, J., dissenting). An ongoing debate persists
over whether the practice of law is a business or a profession, with many ex-
pressing the fear that there is currently too much emphasis on making money
at the expense of the pursuit of justice and service for the public good. See
generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS
IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); SOL
M. LINOwITz & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT
THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994). One scholar has noted that
Justice Holmes many years ago took the position that law is not a business,
because "lawyers, unlike businessmen, pursue money indirectly, putting the
interests of their clients in the driver's seat." David Luban, The Bad Man and
the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes's The Path of the Law, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1582 (1997). Yet, the legal profession has changed since
Holmes' time. One scholar remarked, "In too many law firms, the computer
has become Managing Partner as law firms are ruled by hourly rates, time
sheets and electronic devices." Sol M. Linowitz, Moment of Truth for the Le-
gal Profession, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 1211, 1213. An ABA commission has tried
to revive professionalism through greater policing of the bar and educational
programs. See ABA COMMWN ON PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM
20-25 (1986). Rather than lamenting the transformation of law from a profes-
sion to a business, one scholar suggests a "Middle Range" approach which
would involve government regulation and permit non-lawyers to perform legal
services, while still allowing admission to the bar. See Russell G. Pearce, The
Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will
Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1232-
33 (1995).
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partner was overbilling a client. 153 It argued that the interests
of the partnership should not trump the rules of professional
conduct.154 This is especially true for partners who are attor-
neys, because attorneys are officers of the court and have more
of a duty to their clients and the public than those in other pro-
fessions.1 55 The dissent stated that the majority sent an "inap-
propriate signal to lawyers and to the public that the rules of
professional responsibility are subordinate to a law firm's other
interests."156 It also suggested that the self-regulated nature of
the profession makes it particularly important that attorneys
adhere to ethical obligations. 57 In order to drive home the idea
that attorneys must not avoid their ethical obligations, it also
called attention to the Himmel case, in which an attorney was
punished for not reporting another lawyer's misconduct.1 58
Worrying that the majority opinion failed to encourage adher-
ence to ethical rules and neglected to provide recourse to attor-
neys who report misconduct, it suggested that partners would
be better protected if the ethics rules of the legal profession
were incorporated into law partners' fiduciary relationship.159
C. THE CONCURRENCE
The concurring justices, asserting that neither the major-
ity nor the dissent had a reasonable view of whether a partner-
ship should be liable for expelling a partner who reports what
she or he believes to be unethical conduct, tried to find a mid-
dle road. It declared that the majority should not have rejected
the arguments of the amici curiae that a partnership must re-
153. See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 558 (Spector, J., dissenting).
154. See id. at 559, 561. Dissenting Justice Rose Spector asserted, "The
practice of law is a profession first, then a business. Moreover, it is a self-
regulated profession subject to the Rules promulgated by this Court.". Id. at
559. She went on to state that "[ulitimately, agreements to practice law may
not by their terms or effect circumvent the ethical obligations of attorneys es-
tablished by law." Id. at 560.
155. See id. at 560.
156. See id. at 561.
157. See id. at 560.
158. See id.; see also supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
159. See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 561 (Spector, J., dissenting):
Even if a report turns out to be mistaken or a client ultimately con-
sents to the behavior in question, as in this case, retaliation against a
partner who tries in good faith to correct or report perceived miscon-
duct virtually assures that others will not take these appropriate
steps in the future.
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tain a whistleblowing partner. 60 At the same time, it asserted
that the dissent was impractical in believing that partners can
maintain their trust in each other after one partner has ac-
cused another of misconduct.161 It contended that whistleblow-
ers like Bohatch, whose reports of unethical conduct are incor-
rect, should not be protected from expulsion by their firms.162
"[A] law firm can always expel a partner for bad judgment," ac-
cording to the concurrence. 63 As it noted, "Bohatch did not re-
port unethical conduct; she reported what she believed, pre-
sumably in good faith but nevertheless mistakenly, to be
unethical conduct."'64 The fact that "a client as sophisticated
as Pennzoil" believed that the firm's bills were reasonable
showed that McDonald had not overbilled Pennzoil 65 The
concurrence refused to pay heed to Bohatch's assertion that
there were other reasons for Pennzoil's lack of objection to the
firm's fees. 66 Instead, it assumed that there had been no over-
billing by McDonald and declared that Bohatch had committed
a pure error in judgment that warranted expulsion for the
health of the firm.167 It further stated that the Texas Discipli-
nary Rules of Professional Conduct are not impaired by allow-
ing a firm to fire a partner who makes an erroneous report of
misconduct, since the rules require more than suspicion of a
violation. 68 It declared, "Butler & Binion's expulsion of Bo-
160. See id. at 548 (Hecht, J., concurring).
161. See id. The concurrence stated: "In the dissent's view, partners who
would expel another for such accusations must simply either get over it or re-
spond in damages. The dissents view blinks reality." Id. The concurrence
noted that "[tihere is hardly a schism more fundamental than that caused by
one partner's accusing another of unethical conduct." Id. at 554. Partners
should not be forced to remain partners with someone who has made accusa-
tions of unethical conduct against one of them, because "at the heart of the
partnership concept is the principle that partners may choose with whom they
wish to be associated." Id- at 545 (citing Gelder Med. Group v. Webber, 41
N.Y.2d 680, 684 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)).
162. See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 548 (Hecht, J., concurring).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 554.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 554-55. ("There is nothing to suggest that Pennzoil would
have thought clearly excessive legal fees were reasonable simply because it
did not like Bohatch.").
167. See id. at 555. If Bohatch had disagreed with firm decisions or how to
handle a client's affairs, the firm would have been justified in firing her, even
if she were acting in good faith. See id. "Reporting unethical conduct where
none existed is no different." Id.
168. See id. at 557. Under Rule 8.03(a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
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hatch did not discourage ethical conduct; it discouraged errors
ofjudgment, which ought to be discouraged." 169
D1. AN UNFAIR CHOICE: YOUR ETHICS OR YOUR JOB
It is important for the Texas Supreme Court and the
courts of all of the states to determine whether and to what de-
gree attorneys should be protected from expulsion if they follow
their professional codes of ethics and report the misconduct of
other attorneys. Noting the lack of precedent on this issue, the
dissent in Bohatch remarked that "the scarcity of guiding case
law only heightens the importance of this Court's decision."170
Courts should not wait for state legislatures to act.171
Rather than deciding that partners may, without fear of
recourse, fire partners who in good faith report unethical con-
duct by another attorney, the Bohatch court should have vali-
dated the legal profession's requirement that attorneys report
misconduct and held that Butler & Binion's expulsion of
Colette Bohatch rendered the firm liable for tort damages for
breach of fiduciary duty. While the court was correct in point-
ing out that disharmony in a law firm is possible after an at-
Professional Conduct, a lawyer's duty is triggered by "kmowledge" of a viola-
tion of the rules that "raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's hon-
esty, trustworthiness or fitness."
169. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 555 (Hecht, J., concurring). The concurrence
never explicitly stated when it would allow suits by an expelled partner who
had reported misconduct. Although an erroneous report of unethical conduct
surely deserves expulsion, the concurrence was unwilling to say that expul-
sion based on an accurate report was enough to warrant recovery on the part
of the expelled partner. See id. at 555-56. For one thing, even lawyers who
are sincere can be fired for having poor judgment. See id. It also stated that
because courts have permitted the expulsion of partners for "nothing more
significant than firm policy and abrasive personal conduct... surely a partner
can be expelled for accusing another partner of something as serious as un-
ethical conduct." Id. at 554. It pointed to the differences between large and
small firms, stating that although it had difficulty justifying a large firm ex-
pelling a partner who reports unethical conduct, it reasoned that a small firm
would not survive such allegations. See id. at 548. The concurrence criticized
the notion that law firms should face no liability if they fire a partner who re-
ports the misconduct of another attorney; it also suggested, however, that at-
torneys who have been fired for such reporting ought to be prepared to walk
away from their firms only with a sense of righteousness, and not necessarily
with money damages in hand. See id. at 554-55.
170. Id. at 560 (Spector, J., dissenting).
171. See, e.g., supra note 68 and accompanying text. As Charles Wolfram
has noted, courts have historically beeu the primary regulators of attorneys
and the legal profession. See WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 22-33.
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torney reports another attorney's misconduct, 172 the court also
should have acknowledged that a firm that takes a stand
against ethical lapses may be stronger in the end. In any case,
concerns that individual firms might disband if unethical ac-
tivities are brought to light should not take precedence over
the need for attorneys to adhere to the ethical rules of the legal
profession. In order to encourage both partners and associates
to report and to protect those who do, the court should have
created a public policy exception to the at-will rule for all at-
torneys who in good faith disclose ethical infractions by other
attorneys. In addition, the court should have taken an expan-
sive view of RUPA's requirement of good faith among partners
and held that Butler & Binion acted for improper purposes and
self-gain in firing Bohatch. At the same time, the court should
have called for a revision of RUPA so that partners' fiduciary
duties would explicitly include the duty to adhere to profes-
sional ethics rules. Finally, the court should have held that
reporting attorneys need only have a good faith belief that a
fellow attorney has behaved unethically.
A. THE NECESSITY OF AN ETHICS EMPHASIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
In emphasizing that an "irreparable schism" among part-
ners could occur if partners were forced to stay partners after
one of them reported another's misconduct, 173 the court in Bo-
hatch seemed convinced that maintaining a thriving business
is and should be of utmost importance to partners in law firms.
Worried that partnerships would disintegrate without the
power to get rid of partners who have harmed the firms' busi-
ness in some way, many courts have granted partnerships a
fair amount of leeway in firing partners.1 74 These cases have
generally involved more typical business concerns, such as is-
sues relating to service to clients or policy disagreements,
rather than the reporting of ethics violations.175 The Bohatch
172. See generally supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
173. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 547.
174. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
175. In one case, a court upheld the expulsion of a partner who had battled
alcoholism, which according to the court, had the potential to "damage his
firm's good will or reputation for astuteness in the practice of law." Lawlis v.
Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). In another case
in which the expulsion of two partners from a law firm was upheld, there was
evidence that a political speech by one of them had bothered one of the firm's
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court, however, maintained that the diminished trust and con-
fidence among the partners at Butler & Binion caused by Bo-
hatch's reporting was an adequate reason to fire her.176 The
court was thus less concerned about the underlying problem of
partners breaching their ethical duties than the potential
damage to the stability of a firm where misconduct is brought
to light.
Yet, the possibility of divisions in firms where such re-
porting takes place may have been overemphasized by the
court in Bohatch. Although it is reasonable to assume that
ethical misconduct in a firm would cause partners to be upset
and concerned about their fellow partner who has done wrong,
it is erroneous to conclude that a firm could not survive the re-
porting of misconduct. Reporting misconduct within a firm
might even bring partners together against ethical misconduct
rather than against the person who called attention to the mis-
conduct. Having taken a stand against ethical lapses, a firm
might in the end be even stronger. Firms that encourage at-
torneys to report misconduct will likely have an enhanced
reputation with the public and experience a decrease in mis-
conduct because attorneys will be less likely to act unethically
if they think others are watching and ready to report.77 Al-
though there is always the possibility that a firm will disband
if the unethical activities of its members are brought to light, a
firm's attempt to remain viable by discouraging partners from
reporting internal misconduct would seriously damage a firm
and the individuals who work there, and in addition would
violate the rules of the profession. 7 8 Firms that encourage
compliance with the duty to report may create a model work
big clients. See Holman v. Cole, 522 P.2d 515, 518 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); see
also supra note 143.
176. The Bohatch majority stated that charges such as those made by Bo-
hatch, "whether true or not, may have a profound effect on the personal confi-
dence and trust essential to the partner relationship." 977 S.W.2d at 546-47.
As David Holman, attorney for Butler & Binion, commented after the court's
decision, "When partners no longer wish to be partners they shouldn't be
forced' to remain partners." Polly Ross Hughes, High Court Overturns Firing
Ruling: Decision May Discourage Whistleblower Reports, Hous. CHRON., Jan.
23, 1998, at 27.
177. See Gendry, supra note 25, at 614.
178. Because attorneys are subject to higher ethical standards than those
in most other occupations, their duty, according to the dissent in Bohatch, "af-
fects the special relationship among lawyers who practice law together." 977
S.W.2d at 560. Ethics should therefore be paramount, not just for individual
attorneys, but for law firms as well.
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environment, because "the ethical atmosphere of a firm can in-
fluence the conduct of all its members."179
The court in Bohatch should have paid more heed to the
self-regulated nature of the legal profession and the duty of all
attorneys, whether partners or associates, to keep the profes-
sion in line through the mandatory reporting requirement im-
posed by the Model Rules.180 Attorneys have long been known
to underreport the ethics violations of their peers.' 8' Reasons
for not complying with the rule include negative feelings about
reporting, concerns that reporting could lead to retaliatory fir-
ing or less serious but nevertheless unpleasant snubs from
other attorneys, lack of knowledge of the reporting require-
ment, and the sense that they will not be punished for failing
to report. 8 2 In addition, attorneys may be uncertain whether
they have the requisite knowledge of misconduct to trigger the
reporting requirement. 8 3 The court should also have noted the
current reluctance of attorneys to report the misconduct of
other attorneys and the fact that the court's decision could
have a significant bearing on whether attorneys continue to be
wary of reporting in the future.184 Because the court permitted
179. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, Rule 5.1 cmt.
180. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Bohatch, through observ-
ing McDonald's work hours and reading his billing reports, had knowledge of
McDonald's ethical missteps that raised a "substantial question" as to his fit-
ness as an attorney. See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 544. Believing she was fol-
lowing the District of Columbia Code of Professional Responsibility, she then
reported her findings to the appropriate partners within the firm. See id. at
548.
181. See, e.g., David R. Ramage-White, The Lawyer's Duty To Report Pro-
fessional Misconduct, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 509, 512 (1978); Rotunda, supra note
19, at 979.
182. See Leonard E. Gross, Legal Ethics for the Future: Time To Clean up
Our Act?, 77 ILL. B.J. 196, 197-99 (1988); David C. Olsson, Reporting Peer
Misconduct: Lip Service to Ethical Standards Is Not Enough, 31 ARIz. L. REV.
657, 662 (1989). Attorneys often find it easier to follow the reporting rules
when the attorneys they suspect of misconduct are opposing counsel, rather
than other attorneys within their own law firm or other attorney friends. See
Michael G. Daigneault, Ethics & Professionalism: Am I My Brother's Keeper?,
FED. LAW., June 1996, at 9, 12.
183. See Mitchem, supra note 25, at 1917 (noting that the reporting re-
quirement for misconduct, which does not require an investigation, is differ-
ent from the requirements of reasonable inquiry and adequate preparation to
which attorneys are accustomed through provisions such as Rule 11 of the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure).
1841 See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. Attorneys, like every-
one else, worry about keeping roofs over their heads and food on their tables,
and therefore might not be willing to risk their jobs for the sake of a high-
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the retaliatory expulsion of a partner, both partners' and asso-
ciates' hesitancy to report misdeeds of fellow attorneys has
been reinforced. After Bohatch, attorneys arguably have great-
er reason to fear being fired if they report than to fear Himmel-
type sanctions for not reporting.185 The Texas Supreme Court's
decision not only chills attorney reporting of misconduct but
also indicates a lack of interest in changing the public percep-
tion that lawyers are a part of an unethical profession.
Because maintaining the ethics of the legal profession is of
greater importance than ensuring the livelihood of any given
firm, the court should have found that Butler & Binion was li-
able for expelling Bohatch for adhering to the ethical rules of
the legal profession.18 6 As the dissent in Bohatch noted, "attor-
neys.., bear responsibilities to [their] clients and the bar itself
that transcend ordinary business relationships."187 The major-
ity claimed that its holding was not meant to diminish the
ethical duties of attorneys, 88 but by placing more emphasis on
enabling firms to avoid divisions than on encouraging attor-
neys to follow their ethical duties and report misconduct, the
court discounted the importance of integrity within the legal
profession. 8 9 Attorneys reading the court's decision receive a
strong message that the law is now closer to being a business,
minded ideal, even if it is embodied in a professional rule. As long as they
have little fear of actually being disciplined for not reporting, attorneys may
have an incentive to look the other way in the face of ethical lapses by other
attorneys.
185. In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (III. 1990); see also supra notes 40-42
and accompanying text (discussing the case). Besides fearing being punished
by their law firms if they report internal misconduct by fellow attorneys, some
attorneys might also think that if they report the misconduct of an attorney
outside the firm, they will be assumed to have done so to intimidate their op-
ponent. See Gatland, supra note 33, at 24. According to the chief bar counsel
of the State Bar of Arizona, "[y]ou still get a sense that some lawyers use
Himmel... to file against lawyers they don't like." Id.
186. One commentator has argued that courts and legislatures should
adopt a privilege for attorneys who abide by their professional code of ethics
because professions are at their base service-oriented rather than money-
oriented: "These three unique characteristics of professional work and
authority--collegial, cognitive, and ethical-demonstrate that professionals
are not simply purveyors of expert services in the commercial marketplace."
Moskowitz, supra note 44, at 57.
187. 977 S.W.2d 543, 560 (Tex. 1998).
188. See id. at 547.
189. ABA Canon 29 exhorted lawyers to expose the misconduct of fellow
attorneys and to "strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the
dignity of the profession." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 29
(1969) (superseded in 1969 by the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility).
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with the bottom line being of utmost importance, rather than a
profession, with higher societal and ethical goals. The legal
profession as a whole might not be so thriving and lucrative in
the long run if ethics continue to take a backseat to business
needs.
B. THE NEED FOR AN EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL RULE FOR
ATTORNEYS
Rather than reinforcing the belief that abiding by ethics
rules is not as important as maintaining a stable firm, the Bo-
hatch court should have created an exception to the employ-
ment at-will rule for whistleblowing partners and associates on
the basis of the public policy of encouraging ethics in the legal
profession. Courts have often found public policy exceptions to
the employment at-will rule when the health and safety of the
public are involved. 190 Because attorneys play such an impor-
tant role in public life and a primary part in keeping the legal
profession ethical, which is essential not only for the livelihood
of the profession but for all citizens, they should be protected
from being fired for reporting misconduct.191 The reasons
courts in the past have not deviated from the at-will rule with
respect to attorneys' 92 make less sense when attorneys are
fired for abiding by ethical rules of their profession. The ar-
gument that the public interest is already protected by ethical
codes seems questionable after Bohatch,193 which will surely
result in an even greater unwillingness of the profession to po-
190. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. Encouraging ethical
conduct by attorneys, who serve the public and wield great power, seems to fit
within the variety of definitions given to the term "public policy." For in-
stance, maintaining the highest ethical standards within the legal profession
would fit within the Illinois Supreme Court's belief that "public policy con-
cerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the state collec-
tively." Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill.
1981).
191. One commentator, who believes that professional legal ethics codes
should not serve as public policy limits on the at-will rule, notes how broad
and vague these codes can be. See Dakin, supra note 49, at 1062-63. Employ-
ers often have difficulty understanding their duties under them, and subjec-
tive interpretations abound. See id. Nevertheless, the rule that attorneys
must report misconduct that "raises a substantial question as to [a] lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness" seems fairly unambiguous and not overly
difficult for attorneys or a court to understand. MODEL RULES, supra note 13,
Rule 8.3.
192 See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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lice itself. -Second, the notion that creating a public policy ex-
ception to the at-will rule will harm the attorney-client rela-
tionship may be inaccurate. As long as attorneys inform their
clients that their duty not to reveal information related to the
representation of their clients takes precedence over their duty
to report misconduct by another attorney, clients' fears of dis-
closure of their secrets should be assuaged.19 4 Also, many cli-
ents would recognize the importance of encouraging ethical be-
havior by their attorneys and the long-run benefits of being
served by a profession with high standards of integrity.195 Fi-
nally, as noted above, the argument that the public good is not
implicated here is far from true when one considers the degree
to which citizens rely upon attorneys as their advocates and
representatives. 196 Because the expulsion of attorneys who are
attempting to live up to the high duties associated with a pro-
fession in the law is contrary to societal interest, a public policy
exception to the at-will rule of employment is necessary.
194. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
195. Because attorneys are not permitted to disclose information protected
by the attorney-client privilege, clients should not fear that their attorneys
will divulge such information while reporting the misconduct of another at-
torney. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, information
that is not protected by the attorney-client privilege can be disclosed in an at-
torney's report of misconduct, subject to Rule 1.6. See id. Some clients might
fire an attorney who insists on reporting the misconduct of another attorney,
but there are other clients who "may respond positively to this attempt by the
legal profession to regulate itself." Hutton, supra note 34, at 688. The pub-
lics confidence in attorneys is undermined by attorney misconduct. See Jen-
nifer Staley, Comment, Professional Responsibility-The "Snitch Rule," DR 1-
103-(A), Meets the Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Weider [sic] v. Skala, 19 J.
CORP. L. 353, 372 (1994). An ABA poll conducted in 1993 found that only
twenty-two percent of those surveyed would term attorneys "honest and ethi-
cal," and that forty-eight percent of those surveyed believed that "as many as
three in 10 lawyers lack the ethical standards necessary to serve the public."
Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi: The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll,
ABA J., Sept. 1993, at 60, 62. Although in Bohatch Pennzoil claimed that
McDonald's bills were not too high and that it did not doubt McDonald's eth-
ics, it seems that most clients in this bottom-line day and age would demand
both accountability in terms of their attorney's bills and overall ethical be-
havior.
196. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (noting that reporting helps
protect the public from unethical attorneys). Courts are more likely to find
public policy exceptions to the employment at-will rule because of a profes-
sional code of ethics if there is a fairly substantial public interest served by
that ethical code. See Staley, supra note 195, at 363.
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C. A BROADER VIEW OF FIDUCIARY DuTIEs OWED TO PARTNERS
The court should also have broadened the meaning of fidu-
ciary duties and incorporated the rules of professional conduct
into the fiduciary duties owed between partners. Even if the
court were unwilling to expand the definition of fiduciary du-
ties in this case, it should have held that, under RUPA, the
firm violated at least one of its fiduciary duties. Although
Butler & Binion does not appear to have violated the duties of
loyalty and care, under section 404(b) of RUPA, 197 the partners
could fairly have been subjected to liability for violating the
duty of good faith and fair dealing.
"Good faith" is not explicitly defined in RUPA,198 but But-
ler & Binion's motives in expelling Bohatch for reporting what
she in good faith believed to be unethical conduct do not accord
with any definition of this duty. Some courts wanting to retain
the at-will rule of employment at all costs have refused to ac-
knowledge that, at times, the duty of good faith should prevent
a partner from firing a partner. 199 Yet, in situations in which a
partner is called upon either to live up to ethics rules and be
fired or violate ethics rules and be retained, additional protec-
tions are needed and can be achieved through an expansive
view of "good faith." Just as in one case in which an Illinois
appeals court determined that a firm acted for self-gain and
violated its duty of good faith in expelling a partner who made
requests to see the firm's financial statements, 200 Butler &
197. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Under RUPA § 404(b), the
partnership did not violate the duty of loyalty for the following reasons: (1)
the expulsion action taken by the partners did not involve a failure to account
to the partnership or hold as trustee for it any profit made by the partners; (2)
the partners were not dealing adversely with the partnership; and (3) the
partners were not competing with the partnership.
198. See supra note 81-82 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. Butler & Binion may
not only have not acted in good faith in firing Bohatch, but may also have
acted in bad faith and for self-gain, which some courts have held is a violation
of lawyers' fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d
239, 246 (IM. App. Ct. 1996); Wilensky v. Blalock, 414 S.E.2d 1, 4 (Ga. 1992);
see also supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. While the expulsion deci-
sion was not directly economically driven, Butler & Binion emphasized main-
taining the stability of the firm at the expense of an individual attorney who
had tried to do the right thing. While the "guillotine method" of quickly get-
ting rid of a partner who reports ethical violations committed by other attor-
neys may seem more kind than dragging out an expulsion, see supra note 97
and accompanying text, the fact that the partner was fired at all is the real
concern, rather than the mode of firing.
200. See Winston & Strawn, 664 N.E.2d at 243-46; see also supra notes 89-
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Binion acted for business reasons in order to preserve the firm
at the expense of its ethical duty to support compliance with
the professional rules of conduct. Under a broad understand-
ing of "good faith," which would include the duty to be faithful
to the rules of one's profession, it seems clear that Butler &
Binion violated its fiduciary duty to Bohatch. The court should
have held that any termination of a partner for good-faith re-
porting of misconduct is not done in good faith.
Beyond acknowledging that the duty of good faith had
been breached in this case, the court should have called for a
revision to RUPA that would incorporate adherence to profes-
sional rules of conduct as a fiduciary duty that is owed among
partners. Because "good faith" is subjective and can be inter-
preted in various ways, many partners, such as Bohatch, who
try to live up to their professional duties are not protected from
expulsion. A more substantive protection would exist if part-
ners' fiduciary duties included the duty to comport with profes-
sional ethics rules. Although partners would still have the op-
tion of firing partners for other reasons, partners would not be
allowed to fire a partner who reported the misconduct of an-
other attorney.20'
D. A GOOD-FAITH-ONLY REQUTREMENT FOR REPORTING
A good faith belief that misconduct has been committed
should be the only reporting requirement for attorneys. Attor-
neys should not be required to be accurate in order for them to
be protected from expulsion. Model Rule 8.3 fails to define ex-
actly what level of knowledge is necessary before one reports
ethical lapses,202 and it seems likely that the rule was meant to
encourage attorneys to report misconduct that they believe in
good faith occurred, but for which they may not have indisput-
able evidence.203 Having viewed McDonald's billing records
91 and accompanying text.
201. Dissenting Justice Spector would have permitted partners to expel a
partner in this situation, stating- "Although I agree with the majority that
partners have a right not to continue a partnership with someone against
their will, they may still be liable for damages directly resulting from termi-
nating that relationship." Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 561
(Tex. 1998) (Spector, J., dissenting).
202. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. Bohatch followed the
reporting rule by reporting what she believed to be the misconduct of a fellow
attorney. She did not have a duty to investigate the situation before making
such a report. See Mitchem, supra note 25, at 1917.
203. See Carpenter, supra note 26, at 16-18 (asserting that, under the
1999] 1801
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
and observed his work habits, Bohatch had "knowledge" of an
ethical violation sufficient to trigger her duty to report.2 04 Al-
though the concurrence in Bohatch asserted that if a partner
were mistaken in his or her assessment of misconduct, the
partner should not have any recourse against the firm that
fired him or her,205 a rule requiring attorneys to prove the mis-
conduct of a fellow attorney would probably lead to less re-
porting.2 06 Even if the attorney who reports turns out to be
wrong or the client consents to the behavior at issue, "retalia-
tion against a partner who tries in good faith to correct or re-
port perceived misconduct virtually assures that others will not
take these appropriate steps in the future."2 07 Just because a
reporting attorney turns out to be wrong does not necessarily
mean that he or she exercised poor judgment in reporting.208 It
is not poor judgment to attempt to be ethical. In addition,
courts should be wary about relying upon clients' opinions
about whether they have been overbilled or in some way
harmed by the firm representing them. An attorney has the
duty to report overbilling even if a client approves of a bill for
reasons having nothing to do with ethics. Although Pennzoil
defended McDonald,209 its support may have had less to do
with an honest belief that McDonald was recording the accu-
rate amount of time he spent on Pennzoil's file than its desire
to maintain a longstanding and positive relationship.210 An at-
Model Rules, an attorney should report a fellow attorney's misconduct, even if
he or she is not certain that ethical lapses have occurred).
204. See supra notes 5-7, 26-28 and accompanying text (noting that the
Model Rules suggest that "knowledge" can be inferred from surrounding cir-
cumstances and does not require the reporting attorney to be one-hundred
percent positive).
205. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Even without such a strin-
gent requirement for reporting, attorneys are predisposed to being cautious
before leveling charges against other parties. See Mitchem, supra note 25, at
1917. For instance, under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
any papers filed with a court must be certified by the attorney as having been
"formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances."
207. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 561.
208. Because an attorney is not required to be certain before reporting
ethical misconduct, it seems unfair to punish an attorney who reports what he
or she believes to be misconduct, which turns out not to be misconduct. Ac-
cording to one commentator, if certainty were required, "the reporting re-
quirement would be severely limited to only the most obvious and egregious
cases." Carpenter, supra note 26, at 16.
209. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
210. That Pennzoil had never complained about Bohatch's work until it
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torney who has the courage to make a good faith report of what
he or she believes to be ethical missteps of another attorney
deserves protection by the courts, even if other sources claim
the report to be mistaken.
CONCLUSION
The court in Bohatch v. Butler & Binion was faced with
the choice of either protecting an attorney who followed the
ethics rules of the legal profession or permitting a law firm to
subordinate ethics and fire a partner for the sake of maintain-
ing a stable firm. In choosing to permit Butler & Binion to
oust a partner who in good faith reported what she believed to
be ethical missteps by a fellow partner, without subjecting the
firm to tort damages, the court made it more difficult for attor-
neys to feel comfortable about reporting misconduct.
The court would have been wiser to declare that the inter-
ests of the partnership should not come before the ethics rules
of the legal profession. The court needed to create a public
policy exception to the at-will employment rule in order to pre-
vent the expulsion of attorneys who in good faith follow their
ethical duties and report misconduct. In addition, the court
should have held that Butler & Binion violated its fiduciary
duty of good faith in firing Bohatch and called for a revision to
RUPA that would incorporate into partners' fiduciary duties
the duty to follow the rules of professional conduct. Had the
court championed the reporting requirement over law firms'
business interests, attorneys around the country would have
received the much-needed message that if they report miscon-
duct, they are protected against retaliatory firing. They would
thus have no excuse but to live up to their duties to the profes-
sion.
learned of her accusations of McDonald's overbilling may be an additional rea-
son for believing that Pennzoil might not have been forthright about the real
reason for its lack of concern that McDonald might have overbilled it. See su-
pra note 109 and accompanying text.
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